Workshop Description
For 5G core network architects, RAN security engineers, and 3GPP SA3 participants. This session works through the cryptographic primitives embedded in the 5G signalling and authentication stack, identifies which are vulnerable to quantum attack, and builds a prioritised migration plan for each affected network function.
5G-AKA relies on ECIES for SUPI concealment (Profile A uses Curve25519, Profile B uses secp256r1). Both are broken by a sufficiently capable quantum computer running Shor's algorithm. The N32 interface between SEPPs uses TLS 1.3 with ECDHE key exchange. The SBA service mesh authenticates NF-to-NF communication with TLS mutual authentication. GTP-U tunnels on N3/N9 interfaces may use IPsec with DH key exchange. Every one of these cryptographic dependencies requires a migration path. 3GPP SA3 is studying this in TR 33.875, GSMA has published FS.40 on PQC migration for telecom, and NIST finalised ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) in August 2024. This workshop connects those standards to the specific network functions in your deployment and produces an actionable migration sequence.
What participants cover
- 5G-AKA authentication chain analysis: trace the cryptographic primitives from UE through SEAF, AUSF, and UDM and identify quantum-vulnerable steps
- SUPI/SUCI exposure: evaluate ECIES Profile A and B under quantum threat and assess ML-KEM as a replacement with backward compatibility constraints
- N32 and SBA interface mapping: catalogue TLS profiles, cipher suites, and certificate chains across inter-PLMN and intra-PLMN signalling
- Standards alignment: map 3GPP TR 33.875, GSMA FS.40, and NIST FIPS 203/204/205 requirements to your network architecture
- Network function migration sequencing: determine upgrade order (UDM/AUSF, SEPP, UPF) based on cryptographic criticality and vendor readiness
- Hybrid deployment: design composite certificate strategies (ML-DSA + ECDSA) that maintain interoperability with non-upgraded roaming partners and legacy UEs