Workshop Description
Technical workshop for OT security leads, plant managers, and IT/OT integration teams in mining, quarrying, and mineral processing. Covers the cryptographic exposure of SCADA, DCS, and PLCs in mining operations, the specific constraints of remote site OT environments (satellite connectivity, limited compute), and PQC migration approaches aligned with IEC 62443 and ISA/IEC security standards for industrial automation.
Mining OT environments present constraints that generic PQC workshops ignore. PLCs running on 256KB flash cannot accommodate the same algorithms as enterprise servers. VSAT backhaul links to remote sites impose bandwidth and latency constraints on key exchange that rule out certain hybrid approaches. Safety-instrumented systems rated to IEC 61511 require firmware signing workflows that cannot tolerate the verification latency of larger post-quantum signatures. This workshop addresses those realities directly: participants map their own control network cryptography against the IEC 62443 zone/conduit model, assess FIPS 203/204/205 algorithm fit for their specific hardware, and leave with a phased migration plan that sequences PQC rollout from historian connections through to autonomous haulage fleet communications.
What participants cover
- Protocol-level cryptographic exposure mapping for Modbus TCP, OPC UA, and DNP3 in pit-to-plant architectures
- FIPS 203/204/205 algorithm benchmarking on resource-constrained PLCs (256KB flash, 64KB RAM targets)
- IEC 62443 zone and conduit PQC overlay for open-pit, underground, and processing plant networks
- Harvest-now-decrypt-later risk assessment for historian and telemetry data streams
- Hybrid key exchange design for OPC UA pub-sub and VSAT/LTE remote site backhaul
- Vendor PQC roadmap assessment: Rockwell, Siemens, ABB, and Schneider controller firmware timelines