Workshop Description
Covers quantum random number generation and quantum key distribution for defence and critical infrastructure networks. Examines QRNG entropy sources and device architectures, QKD protocol families (BB84, CV-QKD, MDI-QKD), network deployment models for classified environments, and the vendor landscape. Provides an honest assessment of where these technologies add genuine security value versus where software-based PQC is sufficient.
QRNG devices exploit quantum mechanical processes (vacuum fluctuations, single-photon detection, amplified spontaneous emission) to generate entropy that is certifiably unpredictable under quantum mechanics. QKD uses quantum states to distribute symmetric keys with information-theoretic security, meaning the key exchange is secure against any computational attack, including from a future fault-tolerant quantum computer. The practical question for defence organisations is not whether these properties are real. They are. The question is whether the operational complexity and cost of deploying QRNG hardware and QKD fibre or free-space links is justified for your specific network topology, threat model, and classification level. For most general-purpose encrypted communications, NIST post-quantum algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA) provide adequate protection at far lower deployment cost. QKD adds genuine value for point-to-point high-classification links where information-theoretic key exchange is a requirement. QRNG adds value where entropy source certification to BSI AIS 31 PTG.3 or equivalent is mandated. This workshop maps those boundaries with specificity.
What participants cover
- QRNG entropy source physics: vacuum fluctuation, photon arrival time, ASE, and homodyne detection approaches with their respective entropy rates and certification pathways
- QKD protocol mechanics: BB84 with decoy states, CV-QKD with Gaussian modulation, and MDI-QKD for removing detector vulnerabilities, including security proof assumptions
- Network deployment architectures: trusted node chains, MDI mesh topologies, fibre distance budgets (circa 100 km BB84, 300+ km twin-field), and satellite QKD for global reach
- Defence integration patterns: QKD overlay on existing classified networks, key management system interfaces, and operational constraints for air-gapped environments
- PQC versus QKD trade-off framework: where information-theoretic security is genuinely required versus where NIST PQC algorithms are the more practical choice, informed by NSA CNSA 2.0 and ETSI guidance
- Vendor assessment: independent comparison of QRNG and QKD hardware suppliers including ID Quantique, Toshiba, QuantumCTek, KETS Quantum Security, Quside, and the EuroQCI infrastructure programme