Workshops Automotive PQC for V2X Communication

Automotive Full Day or Half Day Workshop

PQC for Vehicle-to-Everything Communication Protocols

This workshop addresses the quantum cryptographic exposure in V2X communication protocols and builds migration strategies that work within the latency and bandwidth constraints of safety-critical vehicle messaging.

Full day (6 hours) or half day

In person or online

Max 30 delegates

Commission This Workshop View Agenda

Proud to recommend our expert members

Workshop Description

For V2X architects, automotive security engineers, and connected vehicle programme leads. Covers IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI ITS quantum vulnerabilities, V2X PKI trust chain exposure, BSM/CAM signing migration to ML-DSA, bandwidth and latency constraints, and hybrid transition strategies for deployed vehicle fleets.

Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication is one of the most safety-critical applications of public key cryptography in any industry. Every Basic Safety Message (BSM) and Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM) is signed with ECDSA P-256 under IEEE 1609.2. Vehicles verify dozens of these signatures per second to make real-time safety decisions: collision avoidance, emergency braking coordination, intersection management. Shor's algorithm would break ECDSA entirely, enabling an attacker to forge vehicle identities and inject false safety messages into the V2X network. The V2X PKI, from root CAs through pseudonym certificate authorities, is equally vulnerable. The migration challenge is uniquely constrained: post-quantum signatures (ML-DSA at 2,420 bytes) are roughly 38 times larger than ECDSA (64 bytes), creating bandwidth pressure on 802.11p and C-V2X channels. Verification must complete in under 1 millisecond to maintain 10 Hz BSM generation. And vehicles sold today will be on the road for 10 to 15 years, making cryptographic agility in deployed hardware a prerequisite for any migration that does not strand existing fleets.

What participants cover

V2X cryptographic architecture: how IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI ITS use ECDSA, ECDH, and ECIES for message signing, encryption, and PKI trust chains
Quantum threat to safety messages: why Shor's algorithm enables forged BSMs/CAMs, spoofed vehicle identities, and compromised misbehaviour detection
V2X PKI exposure: root CA, enrolment authority, authorisation authority, and pseudonym certificate vulnerabilities across the complete trust hierarchy
Performance constraints: ML-DSA signature size (2,420 bytes versus 64 bytes ECDSA), verification latency requirements, and 802.11p/C-V2X channel capacity limits
PQC migration strategies: ML-DSA for message signing, hybrid ECDSA+ML-DSA for backward compatibility, and PKI transition planning for root and intermediate CAs
Standards roadmap: IEEE 1609.2 revision activity, ETSI ITS security migration, and the 10 to 15 year vehicle lifecycle constraint on deployed fleet migration

Preliminary Agenda

Full-day session structure with scheduled breaks. Content is configurable to your V2X technology stack (DSRC or C-V2X), PKI architecture, and deployment timeline.

#	Session	Topics
1	V2X Communication Architecture and Its Cryptographic Foundation How vehicles authenticate and trust each other on the road
2	Quantum Threats to V2X Protocols Shor's algorithm against IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI ITS security	IEEE 1609.2 security services: ECDSA P-256 signatures on Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) and Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs). Shor's algorithm breaks ECDSA entirely, enabling forged vehicle identity and spoofed safety-critical messages. ETSI ITS security architecture: certificate-based authentication using ECDSA and ECIES. Quantum compromise of the V2X PKI root or intermediate CAs would undermine the entire European C-ITS trust framework. DSRC versus C-V2X: both protocols depend on the same underlying IEEE 1609.2 security layer. The radio access technology differs, but the cryptographic vulnerability is identical.
Break, after 50 min
3	V2X PKI and Certificate Management Under Quantum Threat Root CA compromise, pseudonym certificate rotation, and misbehaviour detection	V2X PKI hierarchy: root CA, enrolment authority (EA), authorisation authority (AA), and pseudonym certificates. Each layer uses ECDSA or ECDH, creating a complete quantum-vulnerable trust chain. Pseudonym certificate rotation: vehicles cycle through short-lived certificates for privacy. PQC certificate sizes (ML-DSA signatures are 2,420 bytes versus 64 bytes for ECDSA) directly impact rotation bandwidth and latency. Misbehaviour detection: the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) relies on cryptographic proofs to identify and revoke compromised vehicles. Quantum attack on these proofs undermines the entire misbehaviour reporting mechanism.
4	Interactive Demonstration: V2X Cryptographic Dependency Audit Full-day format only	Mapping a representative V2X deployment: identifying every ECDSA, ECDH, and ECIES dependency in the message signing, encryption, and PKI layers Evaluating PQC algorithm candidates against V2X latency requirements: BSM/CAM generation at 10 Hz requires signature verification in under 1 millisecond Sizing the bandwidth impact: comparing classical ECDSA certificate and signature sizes against ML-DSA and SLH-DSA alternatives for certificate distribution channels
Break, after 60 min
5	PQC Migration Strategies for V2X Replacing ECDSA in safety-critical, latency-constrained protocols	ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for BSM/CAM signing: performance benchmarks on automotive-grade processors, signature size impact on 802.11p/C-V2X channel capacity Hybrid schemes: running classical ECDSA alongside ML-DSA during transition to maintain backward compatibility with legacy vehicles already deployed PKI migration: transitioning V2X root CAs, enrolment authorities, and authorisation authorities to post-quantum algorithms without breaking the existing certificate ecosystem
6	Standards Roadmap and Industry Coordination IEEE, ETSI, SAE, and regulatory timelines	IEEE 1609.2 revision process: current working group activity on post-quantum algorithm integration and backward compatibility provisions ETSI ITS security: European roadmap for C-ITS trust model migration and the interaction with eIDAS 2.0 qualified trust services Vehicle lifecycle constraint: vehicles sold today will operate for 10 to 15 years. Cryptographic agility in V2X hardware and OTA update mechanisms determines whether deployed vehicles can migrate.
7	Q&A and Migration Planning

Designed and Delivered By

Workshops are designed and delivered by QSECDEF in collaboration with sector specialists. All facilitators have direct experience in both quantum technologies and automotive V2X security systems.

QSECDEF brings world-leading expertise in post-quantum cryptography, quantum computing strategy, and defence-grade security assessment. Our advisory membership spans 600+ organisations and 1,200+ professionals working at the intersection of quantum technologies and critical infrastructure security.

Automotive workshops are co-delivered with sector specialists who bring direct operational experience in V2X deployment, automotive PKI management, and connected vehicle security architecture. This ensures workshop content reflects the real constraints of vehicle communication systems.

Commission This Workshop

Sessions are configured around your V2X technology stack, PKI architecture, and deployment timeline. Get in touch to discuss requirements and schedule a date.

Automotive Workshops All Consulting Services All Workshops